● CVE WATCHLIST CVE-2026-84869 ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2026-123039 Check Point Multiple Products CVE-2026-123158 OpenBSD OpenSSH CVE-2026-19868 SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN CVE-2026-109618 PHP Group PHP CVE-2026-109619 PHP Group PHP

SCKit Malware Exploits Patched CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect to Hijack Technician Sessions

At a glance

CVE
CVE-2026-84869
Product
ConnectWise ScreenConnect
Severity
9.9 · Critical (CVSS 3.1)
Status
Actively exploited · CISA listed 11 Sep 2026
Ransomware use
Not reported
Patch
No patch reference yet
Weakness
CWE-269, CWE-862
Exploit likelihood (30 days)
1.2%

Live data, updated 8 seconds ago, from NVD, CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS.

Threat actors are currently running an active campaign targeting ConnectWise ScreenConnect deployments by exploiting a critical security flaw, CVE-2026-84869, within the remote access software, despite the vulnerability having been patched. This exploitation allows attackers to deploy the SCKit toolkit, effectively transforming legitimate remote support sessions into pathways for wider compromise across managed service providers (MSPs).

The flaw, identified as CVE-2026-84869, involves improper privilege management and missing authorization, carrying a CVSS score of 9.9. Attackers leverage this weakness to transfer and execute files through an active remote session without requiring host confirmation, a capability that is central to the infection chain.

The SCKit toolkit initiates a sophisticated attack sequence utilizing the platform’s built-in Run Command function. This function is first used to check for an existing ScreenConnect installation before downloading and executing an attacker-controlled MSI installer named ‘sc.msi.’ This installer subsequently deploys ‘sckit-run.bat,’ a batch script dropper that contacts ns.mo7sen[.]dev to fetch a PowerShell decoder and deploy the remaining components of the toolkit.

A critical element of the malware is RelayTrap, a component designed to interfere with ScreenConnect Guest sessions. RelayTrap functions by replacing the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest session and subsequently sending the SCKit payload back to a connecting technician for execution. If the technician’s workstation runs this payload, SCKit actively searches local browser data and process memory to recover an authenticated management session, including .ASPXAUTH cookies.

With this recovered session, the threat actors gain the ability to execute commands under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context without needing to steal credentials directly. This access enables the malicious worm to silently install an identical client connected to threat actor-controlled infrastructure. Furthermore, the worm targets IT support technician workstations using the hijacked, authenticated ScreenConnect session and leverages the victim’s management console to distribute payloads to other managed devices.

The toolkit also establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry Run entries. The ability of SCKit to hijack authenticated operator sessions and utilize legitimate ScreenConnect management features to push malicious code highlights a persistent risk. While testing against a fully patched ScreenConnect client successfully prevents the execution of the exploit’s payload, the danger associated with a compromised operator session remains significant.

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